Here is a number that sounds made up but is not: by 1914, the year the First World War began, the empires of Europe — together with the United States, Russia and Japan — controlled roughly 84 percent of the land surface of the Earth. Not 14, not 34: eighty-four. A handful of small countries, several of them the size of a single American state, ran almost the entire planet. The story of how that happened is one of ships, medicine, machines — and a map drawn inside a conference room.
Start with the ships. For most of history, faraway lands were protected by distance more than by armies. Then square-rigged ocean ships, and later the steamship, shrank the planet: a voyage that took months became weeks, and a weekly schedule replaced a heroic expedition. Coaling stations and harbors followed the routes, and each harbor quietly became a claim. Distance had been the world's best defense; engineering deleted it.
Next, medicine. Tropical Africa had defeated European expeditions for centuries, and the killer was not spears but malaria. In the 1800s quinine — a bitter medicine made from the bark of the cinchona tree — became available in steady supply, and suddenly Europeans could survive the interior long enough to occupy it. It is one of history's coldest ironies that a medicine made from a plant the colonizers did not discover unlocked the continents whose people they then subjugated.
Third, machines. The repeating machine gun of the 1880s meant a small detachment could hold a field against enormous numbers; the railway and the telegraph meant a governor could move soldiers, orders and extracted goods at speeds no local army could match. The maxim gun, the steamboat, the telegraph wire and the railway together turned a risky raid into a routine administration. When the British poet Hilaire Belloc wrote that whatever happens, "we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not," he was stating the whole strategy in two lines.
But machines and medicine explain speed, not scale. The scale came from competition: Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and Spain were racing each other, and each feared the others would grab the unclaimed parts first. The sharpest example is Africa. European traders had long clung to coastal posts; then, in 1884 and 1885, delegates of the powers met at the Berlin Conference and drew rules for claiming the interior — effective occupation would count, borders were agreed between Europeans, and the people actually living on the continent were not represented at all. Within a generation, almost the whole of Africa was under European rule; only Ethiopia and Liberia kept full independence. Kingdoms centuries old were split by lines their kings had never seen, and rival nations were stapled together or cut in half by rulers in Berlin, Paris and London.
Add up the pieces and the arithmetic of 1914 appears. Britain alone held roughly a quarter of the planet, an empire on which the proverbial sun never set, including India with its hundreds of millions of people. France held a second vast belt across Africa and Asia. Small Belgium ran a personal colony — the Congo — many times its own size, with consequences so cruel that they scandalized even the other empires. The 84 percent was not one empire's plan; it was several rival plans accidentally adding up to the whole yard.
Two honest footnotes. First, "took over" was possible because the takeover was mostly of governments, not of empty land: the colonized were the overwhelming majority everywhere, and ruling them needed collaborators, armies of local clerks and soldiers, and constant negotiation. Second, the map created in that conference-room era is still with us: many of today's borders in Africa and Asia are lines drawn by men who never saw the rivers and mountains they were dividing. The 84 percent of 1914 is gone — but the map it left behind is one of the reasons the twenty-first century still argues about lines drawn over tea.